By Rabbi Meshulam Gotlieb

Last summer I pondered the furor over the upcoming disengagement process. Trying to come to terms with the rival views intellectually by exploring them through the age-old question of the individual versus the collective, I wrote the following words:

“As Israel goes through the throes of the disengagement from the Gaza Strip and four settlements in Northern Samaria this summer, the conflict between the collective and the individual, a long time staple of political and social thought¹, once again rears its head in the form of, what at times, is a very ugly confrontation. Both on the left and right, individuals are forced to confront their relationship with each other and with the state and its laws. Whatever solutions are found to this particular battle, the scars inflicted by it on these relationships will mold Israeli society for decades to come.”

And yet the naked truth was that, as I watched the process unfold on the tenth and eleventh of Av 5765, my mind was overthrown. I relived the words Jeremiah spoke so long ago, “my groans are many, and my heart is sick” (Lamentations 1:22, my translation). Words were certainly not enough, and intellectualizing cold comfort, for the self-inflicted ruin that was overtaking the people of Israel (or, at the very least, depending upon your political opinion, that was overtaking certain people and certain communities in Israel).

At the time I chose to be silent following the dictum of our Sages that one should not comfort the mourner [in this case, the (national-religious) right wing element in society] when the body still lies in front of him. Now, however – in Adar, 5766 – four events have transpired over the last six months which urge me to wait no longer. I must attempt to assuage the pain and hurt of those on the religious right wing of the political spectrum because their hurt and—all too often legitimate—ever-increasing anger is leading to rhetoric and actions that bring us to the brink of a “war among brothers²”.

Firstly, even six months after disengagement, the overwhelming majority of those individuals removed from their communities in Gaza – even those who agreed to move before the disengagement began—still find their lives in shambles. Economically, emotionally and psychologically they have been broken, and the country has not taken the necessary steps to make them whole again³ . Secondly, Israeli society all too rapidly disengaged from the issue of the disengagement. The country moved on so quickly that even the central reburial ceremony of those disinterred, occurring a scant few days after the disengagement, barely merited press coverage, and when a critical parliamentary review of the disengagement and resettlement process was recently unveiled, it was buried by the press and the general disinterest of the public. Thirdly, during the recent Amona evacuation the police brutally assaulted seated, apparently, unarmed, right wing, religious protesters and charged their horses into non-violent protesting crowds. No matter what atmosphere of verbal and physical violence was created by certain protesters, including the throwing of heavy concrete blocks at the evacuating force, the police clearly stepped far beyond the bounds of necessary force.

Fourthly, Ehud Olmert’s decision not to reach a compromise in order to prevent this confrontation, and his tacit approval of brutal police tactics, both through his choice of the police unit used to evacuate the settlers and his refusal to seriously investigate its tactics afterwards⁴, smacked of self-interested electioneering and only served to further alienate the religious right who now felt that not only their houses and dreams, but also their lives, were at the mercy of the self-interested upper echelons of the government, brutal law enforcement officials, a press corps eager to silence any serious discussion of the issue⁵, and, at best, a totally apathetic, if not inexplicably hostile, Israeli public.

This appalling emotional and physical neglect of the Gush Katif transferees by the government, the apathy – if not outright hostility – of the Israeli press and public to discussing their fates, and the violence unleashed at the protesters in Amona, has led those on the religious right (who identify most closely with these refugees due to religious and ideological bonds) feeling increasingly, and dangerously, disenfranchised from the actions of the country and its government.

Without arguing for or against the disengagement, itself, criticizing or defending the police actions taken at Amona, or even arguing for or against further disengagements, I would like to offer these people – my people on the national-religious right – a new paradigm for comprehending themselves and the Other, a more nuanced mode of thinking about the individual and the collective to help us assuage our pain, understand our feelings better, and enable us to comprehend the apathy, if not actual animus, of the Israeli people and many of its leaders.

In Israel today, the paradigms available for balancing between the collective and the individual run the gamut from self-sacrifice to self-centeredness: from the attitude espoused by John F. Kennedy, in his famous cry, “Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country,” to the attitude of magia‘ li – what must the state do for me – oftentimes engendered by the welfare state.

Thus, on the one hand, there are young men – both religious and secular – volunteering for grueling, dangerous, and, oftentimes, fatal army service. Likewise there is the religious, Dor ha-Hemshekh movement of the settlers, whose rhetoric prioritizes sacrifice for one’s country (or G-d⁶), the Orange campaign to save the settlements in Gaza, the Peace Now political activists trying to reform the state, and the recent phenomenon of urban kibbutzim set up by idealistic, secular youngsters trying to make the world in which they live a better place.

On the other hand, reading the newspaper, one learns that students at one of Israel’s top high schools, Haifa’s elitist Reali school, prioritize looking out for themselves and feel that sacrifice for one’s country is passé [7]. Significantly, legal, draft dodging by those on the secular Israeli left has reached epidemic proportions, and when the Minister of Finance tried to recently push through cuts in social welfare payments, the country was up in arms over the state closing off its coffers. While the argument against these cuts was made in terms of humane socialism, ultimately, for many of the protesters, it boiled down to their sense of entitlement. Having become used to a welfare state which took care of them, they felt that they deserved to receive a certain standard of living from the state, no matter whether or not they took responsibility for their own economic situations. In the oft-quoted words of one welfare recipient, “I can’t afford to buy my children cornflakes for breakfast,” lies the reality that she expected to be able to feed her children what, in Israel, is not the least expensive breakfast.

Thus, in Israel today the scale oftentimes tilts radically one way or the other. Some seem to believe that the individual exists to serve the state⁸ (and can not comprehend fellow citizens whom they perceive to be materialistic, hedonistic, and self-interested), while others believe that the state should serve them, and have difficulty comprehending those freierim (etymologically, free-thinkers, and, today, literally simpletons) who let the state take advantage of them by serving it.

While this issue has been discussed by many secular thinkers, within my own religious context, and, especially given the present religious angst over the issue, I would like to suggest two approaches to the issue. The first, based upon the work of noted historian Arthur M. Schlessinger, Jr., presents a historical paradigm which may help the religious right comprehend the Other. The second, turning to a reform of this religious community itself, presents several religious paradigms designed to enable a more nuanced relationship between the individual and his community, which in turn may enable a healing process to begin.

In an article on cycles in American history, Schlessinger observed a conflict similar to the ongoing one in Israel today, between individuals promoting self-sacrifice and those promoting self-interest. He described a thirty-year alternation between a society preoccupied with “public-purpose” and one dedicated to “private-interest⁹.” During the former, individuals aspire to “ask what they can do for their country” and during the latter “worn out by the constant summons to battle and weary of ceaseless national activity … they seek a new dispensation, an interlude of rest and recuperation…[10]”. In the former period public issues preoccupy society, while in the latter private happiness dominates the agenda¹¹. While during both phases wars have been fought and economic recessions handled, the collective mood of society, and by extension, that of its leaders (who sometimes even respond to the national mood and act “against their own inclinations¹²”), will determine the subtly different ways these battles are waged¹³.

While Schlessinger seems to privilege the eras of “public-service” by deeming them more moral (“idealists have many faults, but they rarely steal¹⁴,” ), he also clearly concedes that notwithstanding the excessive self-interest, materialism, hedonism and the overriding quest for self-gratification which may occur in the “private-interest” eras, these eras are necessary and even helpful, for they serve to “correct … against excesses of public concern … replenish[ing] the self, the family and the private economy¹⁵.” Indeed, as Schlessinger puts it, private-interest eras arise as a reaction to public-purpose ones for “there are not enough hours in the day both to save the nation and to cherish one’s family … ultimately public action exhausts¹⁶.” Thus, Schlessinger recognizes that the spiral movement of the American polity between public-service and private-interest is a necessary one, one rooted deep in the human psyche which calls for homeostasis¹⁷, and one which can not be avoided.

Of course, the very existence of cyclical patterns is always difficult to prove. Yet, risking the charge of selectively chosen evidence as well as the charge that applying Schlessinger’s particular spiraling pattern to Israeli society may not be justified by the last fifty plus years of Israeli history, I would nonetheless argue that the basic notion of a deep structure in society which promotes shifting from private-interest eras to public-service ones and back again is a logical one both in our historical context and in terms of human nature. Indeed, even the widely accepted (though simplistic) narrative pitting the religious right as messianic fanatics against the mainstream materialistic, hedonistic, self-interested segment of Israeli society supports this division into those trumpeting public service and those trumpeting self-interest.

For seemingly unaware of Schlessinger’s history lesson, the religious right in Israel cries out for a never-ending rallying of the troops for “public-service.” Witness, for instance, the astonishing number of well-attended demonstrations, not to mention the whole settlement enterprise, and the Right’s unwillingness to let it die. It seems to believe that “private-interest” eras can be avoided. Indeed, it can not comprehend the apparent laziness of the general Israeli population, and mourns the loss of the pioneering spirit which used to permeate this country.

Within Schlessinger’s cyclical paradigm, however, it becomes readily apparent that the Israeli population (which built the country over the last fifty plus years) is tired of “public-service.” Having been bred on stories of selfless pioneers, and having devoted themselves to the state during two to three years in the standing army (as well as, in many cases, continuing to contribute additional reserve duty year after year), most average Israelis yearn for a period of “private-interest.”

Perhaps the most telling proof for this collective mood – aside from the customary, post-army year touring abroad – is the widely supported decision to build a protective fence and the solid support for disengagement (attested to by the ascendancy of the pro-disengagement parties in the pre-election polls). Rather than engaging in protracted warfare (demanded by the far right) or even than in active pursuit of a peace treaty (demanded by the far left¹⁸), the majority of individuals in Israeli society just want to be left alone in peace.

Indeed, while the religious right wing tends to argue that the public does not really feel this way¹⁹ and that Sharon would have lost a referendum on disengagement, I would argue that the basic lack of debate over the building of the fence (where both the right wing’s and far left wing’s discomfort with it were largely ignored by the press) and the overwhelming popular support for both Olmert’s Kadimah Party and the Labour Party (both left of center and popularly perceived to be pro another disengagement, as indicated by the polls) show where the Israeli public really stands²⁰.

While the right claims that the population has been led to this view by the manipulation of the press (and, indeed, the left wing nature of the press as a whole has been quite apparent throughout this process²¹), I would argue, firstly, that the press’s power to lead is limited, and if the majority of Israelis disagreed with the line the press has taken, the press would be forced to temper its approach. For instance, in the period following Operation Homat Magen, even Haaretz responded to the mood of the public by shifting rightward. Presumably, Haaretz shifted both because momentarily its own journalists became more hawkish and because it had to respond to the sentiment of the country, or risk becoming a laughing stock and losing market share. Secondly, I would argue that even if a genuine assault by the press can manipulate the population’s position, this can only happen to the degree that it has happened in Israel if the population is basically open to the press’s approach. In a jingoistic, public-service era not only would the press itself not be likely to make this argument (or, they would make it using a different tone), but the people would not be prone to listen to it.

Rather than denigrate and fight against this “self-interest” trend (and blame the press), the religious right might be more successful and content if it comprehended why this was so, and attempted to work with the prevailing psyche of the nation rather than bemoaning or confronting it. Indeed, as Tocqueville has noted, one of the dangers of this “individualism” (his term) is that “they [might] at last so entirely give way to a cowardly love of present enjoyment as to lose sight of the interests of their future selves … rather than to make when it is necessary, a strong and sudden effort to a higher purpose²²”.

In our political context, the Israeli populous might sell the long-term security of the country for short-term peace and quiet. If it accurately comprehended the mood of the country, the religious right might provide a bulwark against this danger by modeling for others the possibility of a balanced relationship between the individual and the collective rather than becoming a lightning rod for those who oppose excessive public-service, and only modeling for them the dangers of this approach. People who are principally driven by private-interest issues do not like to be continually called to the flag, as if no other world view were possible or even plausible. Additionally, the religious right might also stop feeling so sorry for itself if it realized where the Israeli apathy and antipathy for its enterprise was really coming from, and to some degree, be able to accept their intrinsic, contextual legitimacy.

Indeed, what Tocqueville writes about these individualistic Americans for whom “love of wealth [is] at the bottom of all that [they] do²³,” is also true of the Israeli people: “An American attends to his private concerns as if he were alone in the world, and the next minute he gives himself to the common welfare as if he had forgotten them. At one time he seems animated by the most selfish cupidity; at another, by the most lively patriotism²⁴.”

The religious right wing community would do well to remember this schizophrenic combination of self-centeredness and selflessness in the Israeli character, as it slowly increases it own feelings of superiority, isolation and alienation from the general Israeli populous. Those “hedonistic, materialistic” Israelis still do reserve duty and support the country in many ways (including, by voting and taking left wing positions). Feelings leading to actions that will only further alienate ordinary Israeli’s from the pioneering notions of public-service, will not serve the right wing well.

Indeed, recent front page headlines in Maariv [25]trumpeting the “sms” threats received by high-ranking police officers who took part in the Amona evacuation²⁶, the attack dog set upon family members, and the torching of one officer’s car, demand that the right as a whole – which admittedly may not be characterized by this extremist element in its midst – take a step back and realize their own logical inconsistency, for these policemen whom they are attacking for their activities at Amona also daily risk their lives for the security of the Jewish people and the state²⁷.

The religious right must understand the “Other” in order to rejoin Israeli society in a healthy manner – even if it chooses to maintain its own fanatically messianic, “public-service” identity. However, as it rejoins the nation, in my opinion, it would also be helpful if it opened itself up to other perceptions of the relationship between the individual and the collective. For as Rabbi Dr. Avi Walfish has pointed out, “whether one harmonizes with Rav Kook or dialecticizes with Rav Soloveitchik … one finds Jewish religious spirituality in knowing how to balance the genuine need to “find” and “express” one’s self with the need to surrender one’s self for others and for the Wholly Other²⁸.”

What is required in the national-religious world today is the openness to, and, perhaps, adoption of a “new balance” between the individual and the collective, so that national-religious society as a whole can deal healthily and intelligently with the new psychological and political reality.

Before suggesting options for this new balance, I would first like to dismiss two classical paradigms which seem to suggest balance, but which, I would argue, are really clever re-workings of the old polarized positions. The first – the argument that doing what is best for oneself, is, ipso facto, doing what is best for society – was recently eloquently expressed by an Israeli high school student: “I think this is a distorted way of looking at it – whether you should care more about yourself or about society – because I think that doing what you believe in, what you want, without giving in to social pressures, is the best way to make a contribution to society²⁹. ”

While this approach pays lip service to the importance of contributing to society as the higher goal, ultimately, it argues for doing whatever one wants. This formulation often becomes a façade for rampant self-interest. Indeed, as Arthur Schlessinger, Jr., has noted: “Private-interest eras rest on the principle that the individual promoting his own interests promotes the general interest … The ethos of self-interest dominates all³⁰.” While understandable, this over-emphasis on self-interest ultimately totally undermines true commitment to public service to the point where, as Schlessinger points out, corruption abounds; this corruption among public officials will ultimately undermine the best interests of the public.

The second approach – that doing for others, will lead to, in and of itself, the highest level of self-fulfillment – is often offered by religious apologists, who argue that subsuming oneself to the divine mandate is the ultimate act of the individual ego. While this approach can lead to a narcissistic religious experience in which the individual thinks only of himself and his own spiritual advancement, forgetting any obligation to the community, it may also lead to complete “selfless” self-fulfillment for the individual who sacrifices himself on the altar of the Other; however, even in this case, it only does so by nullifying the individual, qua individual. The state³¹ or religion presents its claims, and the individual, for his or her own good, blindly follows them³².

Thus, both of these subtler approaches, while recognizing, the need for a terminology that recognizes the other pole of the individual-collective equation, ultimately, nullifies the other pole by making it synonymous with the first. It is the latter approach, common especially among the religious right wing in Israel, which I would suggest has brought the moment to its crisis for many people. For those who believe in this path stand not only (potentially) to lose their own homes if they live in Judeah or Samaria. They also are losing their dream of a Greater Israel, as well as their sense of self-identity and self-realization. For they have, in a psychological sense, become the state of Greater Israel.

Indeed, even those on Israel’s political right who have sacrificed themselves by serving in the army or intelligence services for Israel’s security, or, even those who have simply left home and family abroad to make aliyah, and in so doing based part of their self worth on the state’s, may feel a sense of loss and bewilderment at the apparent surrender of Gaza to Hamas and Fatah with no tangible returns. No matter how many times they may have heard Ariel Sharon, Shaul Mofaz and more lately Ehud Olmert claim that we are disengaging, or should disengage, out of strength, they too may lose their center of gravity.

Let us seek, then, other models for balancing the individual and collective that address the circumstances in which we find ourselves today. In dealing with the paradox of individual and community, Rabbi Jonathan Sacks begins his argument with an analogy suggesting that the individual’s choice to act within or for a society is similar to the use of language. That is, the individual must accept certain syntactical and semantic rules, within which he can learn to speak his own individual, unique language. As R. Sacks writes: “Like language, morality [part of the shared societal covenant] testifies to the paradox that only by yielding to something which is not individual can we become individuals³³.” Thus, on the one hand, the individual conforms to and supports society [for he does need to speak in some language], while on the other hand, this sacrifice enables him to attain considerable personal freedom, as he fashions his own unique usage of this language. Indeed, since man is a social creature, his only option for healthy individuality is to learn and speak a dialect of the language spoken by other men.

Rav Aharon Lichtenstein, taking this approach a step further, presents the problem as a thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. First he presents his thesis: “To the Halachah, both poles in the antinomy – the individual and the community, the moral freedom of the Jew and the historic destiny of Israel – are indispensable positive elements.” Then he presents his anti-thesis: “At the practical level, their interests may no doubt clash, and some quasi-Hegelian synthesis or a transcendant modus operandi must be developed to harmonize them.” Attempting to reach this synthesis he continues: “As a value, however, each is self-validating, worthy of being preserved for its own sake. They exist in dialectical tension, and their reconciliation or integration must revolve around coordinate foci.” Finally he writes:

“It should be emphasized, however, that Judaism does not regard the destinies and development of the individual and the community as merely independent desiderata. It sees them as inextricably intertwined, not only supplementary, but complementary. A spiritually oriented society is not only necessary per se as a realization of divine purpose and collective destiny. It is an indispensable condition for the fulfillment of the individual Jew – not only in the obvious pragmatic sense that his total personality cannot properly mature in isolation, or that perhaps, as some would have it, the very notion of a wholly nonsocial human existence is inconceivable, but rather in the far deeper sense that his identification with knesset Israel is an integral aspect of the Jew’s personal identity. His community is not only a context within which the Jew thrives and from which he derives sustenance; it is the vehicle through which his personal experience transcends the bounds of his own existence. It transmutes an isolated act into an aspect of a divinely ordered plan. It relates the Jew to history and metahistory³⁴. ”

Unlike, R. Sacks who suggests that the individual cannot define himself without his community, R. Lichtenstein goes a step further and suggests that although an individual may exist without a community, the Jew’s intrinsic identity is always already bound up with his community. While preserving the integrity of both individual and community, Lichtenstein thus sees the two inextricably bound up with one another, to the greater good of both.

Notably, both Rabbis Sacks and Lichtenstein manage to allow for the maximum self-actualization of the individual as well as the maximum contribution of the individual to society. By binding society and the individual together in a never-ending duet, they ensure that the individual supports the society, and the society supports the individual. This type of relationship is not to be mistaken for John Locke’s social contract, where the individual owes the society and the society owes the individual. Rather, as the metaphors used by Sacks and Lichtenstein indicate, this relationship is more akin to a covenantal (`marital’) relationship – where each partner agrees to “a commitment to the common good³⁵” and to each other.

Indeed, going a step further, I would argue that the metaphors which Rabbis Sacks and Lichtenstein use seem to indicate a symbiotic relationship where the individuals gain their sustenance from the community, and the community is nurtured by its individuals. This sort of relationship outstrips both contractual and covenantal relationships as it seems to destroy the binary distinction between individual and other, by creating two entities: “the individual of society” and “the society made up of its individuals.” While the individual and the society still exist, in practical terms, in a healthy relationship, each one is so dependent upon the other, or, one might say interdependent, that the binary opposition between them is dissolved. A Jew, to be a healthy Jew, cannot be divorced from his community, and the community in order to remain healthy must support the individuality of its members.

Discussing the Pesach seder, Rabbi David Hartman, at first glance, seems to echo this approach: “The leader has to affirm the singularity of individuals even while leading family participation in a commonality. How are collectivity and uniqueness created? … How does one fashion rootedness in a people without abandoning each persons identity … These are the dramatic challenges³⁶.” While obviously speaking from within a decidedly, individual-focused, twentieth century orientation, R. Hartman manages to distill the voice of our tradition which does demand “listening to the intangible uniqueness of each [family] member³⁷.”

However, reading him more closely, R. Hartman may be suggesting a slightly different approach and, indeed, may be echoing the dialectical teachings of his rebbe, Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik, who suggested that “the greatness of man manifests itself in his inner contradiction, in his dialectical nature, in his being single and unrelated to anyone, as well as in his being thou-related and belonging to the community structure³⁸.”

Unlike R. Lichtenstein, R. Sacks and my own interdependent suggestion above, which all try to create some sort of a harmony between the two opposing prongs of the argument, R. Hartman and R. Soloveitchik seem to admit that, in a certain sense the two are, and should be, inherently separate. As Yonasan Sacks has written in describing Rav Soloveitchik’s thought: “Both experiences, that of independence as well as that of togetherness, are inseparable basic elements of man’s religious experience and awareness. The Jew must recognize that having been created in G-d’s image, he is personally endowed with infinite worth and sanctity. At the same time, however, he must see himself as part of the covenantal community, the unique and indivisible collectivity of Knesset Yisra’el³⁹.”

Educating for this sort of dialectical society, where the individual both remains a vital part of society, but also retains his essential selfhood requires great finesse. As R. Hartman writes: “I would not pretend that Jews always succeed … Pesach comes each year so we can try again⁴⁰.”

Indeed, notwithstanding the hot summer we faced in Israel and its bleak aftermath, and the breaking of my heart at seeing it happen, given the historical reality of paradigm shifts from public service to private interest and all the possible paradigms presented in this paper for reworking the relationship of the individual with the collective, I see a window of both hope and opportunity. For when old paradigms are brought to the breaking point – with even HaRav Yaakov Meidan suggesting that the dati leumi community has been stabbed in the back by secular Israel, and must look for a new partner in the Hareidi world – new ones may arise.

While it would only be natural for different members of society to choose those paradigms which best suit their own psychological profiles and personal inclinations, at this juncture I would suggest that as for society as a whole we should educate towards a deeper historical understanding of our cyclical situation and educate towards either those more harmonistic nuanced versions I have suggested above, or towards the dialectical approach as exemplified by Yonason Sacks’ summation of Rav Soloveitchik’s approach, an approach which synchronically mirrors the diachronic dichotomy between self-interest and public service in Schlessinger’s historical paradigm. This educational initiative may help the left understand both its hatred of or distaste for the Israeli religious right, and may provide it with the tools for refashioning its place within society. Likewise, the religious right may gain a new perspective on how both the left and itself fit into the framework of Knesset Yisrael.

Fortunate are we, for as the Jewish people, G-d has blessed us with a long history, a historical book, the Tanakh, and a set of rules to teach and guide us, which if properly fine-tuned can provide the framework for a very, healthy society⁴¹. As Rabbi Jonathan Sacks has suggested – if we begin working in our small, microcosmic, local communities and move upward from them toward the national level, much can be done to better our society⁴². So may it be His will, and may we merit to see the rebuilding of the Temple, speedily in our days.

fn.1 See for instance the works of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau where they are relevant to these issues.

fn.2 While the religious right wing tends to treat the fears of the left as to the likelihood of potential religious, right wing violence, as itself incitement against them, a Torah lecture recently advertised at Beit Midrash Machon Ben Yishai co-incidental to Ariel Sharon’s hospitalization was entitled “Should One Pray For An Evil Person Who Is Ill” (09/01/05). That Sharon could possibly be referred to as evil in a public advertisement, underlies the dangerous drift some on the religious right are experiencing, for they even fail to see the danger in labeling Sharon as “evil.”

fn.3 See http://new.katif.net and www.jobkatif.org.il and links cited therein for information on this issue. And see Naomi Regan’s editorial in the Jerusalem Post (November 27, 2005) written one-hundred days after the evacuation, http://www.naomiragen.com/Gush%20Katif/Helping%20Gush%20Katif%20Evacuees.htm, for a sense of the Israeli government and publics’ betrayal of these displaced persons.

fn.4 After the Knesset ordered a commission of enquiry be established on February 22 2006, Olmert (demonstrating a cock-suredness and hubris concerning the certainty of his forming the next government rare even among politicians) went so far as to declare that he would disband the enquiry “the day after the elections,” and right before the parliamentary vote on setting up the enquiry declared that he would not investigate the actions of police officers and soldiers who were carrying out orders. Playing to the media and with an eye to the upcoming elections, in making this latter point, he spun the issue ignoring the possibility (the very reason for an investigation) that police officers and soldiers whom he had ordered evacuate Amona could have possibly overstepped the legal bounds of their directive.

fn.5 Indeed, an important report critical of MK Efi Eitam, who was injured at Amona, was released shortly before Shabbat. Conveniently, Eitam, who is religious, could not adequately confront his accusers until twenty-four hours of negative press damage had been done. Indeed, the report even noted that when approached he had no comment. Here the arrogance of the press seems to know no bounds, for even if it did make him aware of the expose earlier, it cynically made use of Eitam’s religious observance by publishing an expose in the Sabbath papers and robbing him of an immediate, comprehensive and, hence, appropriate right of reply to the report itself.

fn.6 The somewhat, analogous issue of the relationship between the individual and his G-d, as presented in Pirke Avot 2:4, “make your will, His will, so that he will make your will His will,” (my translation) will not be directly discussed in this paper. Indeed, within a religious, Jewish context, and, especially, in the context of the religious individual relating to his Jewish community or country, the fiat of G-d is always in the background. However, plumbing the depths of that particular issue will not be my goal here.

fn.7 Derfner 11-12

fn.8 Curiously, historically this attitude may be reflected by the Hebrew words for public servants, ‘ovde medinah, literally, servants of the state. In the West these individuals serve the public, in Israel they are meant to serve the state.

fn.9 Admittedly the triumphal march of personal autonomy and individualism in the twentieth century, fuels self-interest in our own era; however, self-interest’s existence in generations past points to its constant, independent influence on societal dynamics, notwithstanding the societal ethos of autonomy and individualism at various times.

fn.10 Schlessinger 28.

fn.11 Schlessinger 25.

fn.12 Ibid, 32.

fn.13 Ibid 25, 27-28, 44.

fn.14 Ibid 41. This insight may explain the monstrous levels of corruption in present-day Israeli society (allegedly reaching to Prime Minister Sharon himself and his son, Omri, who while still actively engaged in politics was recently sentenced to nine months in jail). Also note the Teflon effect described by Schlessinger wherein corrupt individuals are not punished by the public for their actions in these eras. This effect also seems to find its reflection in Israel today where corruption is talked about but all too little seems to be done about it. (Ibid 42)

fn.15 Ibid 40.

fn.16 Ibid.

fn.17 Ibid 27.

fn.18 That there may be no one to sign a peace treaty with has not dissuaded those on the far left from pursuing this option.

fn.19 As testified to by Sharon’s land slide election on a staunchly right wing platform and the Homat Magen offensive.

fn.20 Indeed, Sharon Katz, editor of a staunchly national-religious right wing monthly magazine entitled Voices, seems to have also come to this realization in the February 2006 issue, as referring to Ehud Olmert’s infamous, June 9, 2005, “we are tired” address to the Israel Policy Forum at New York’s Waldorf-Astoria she writes: “Many people in Israel today are tired. They’re tired about worrying about the poor, the homeless and the evacuated. They’re tired of fretting over terrorist attacks and drive-by shootings … They’re too tired to do miluim … They’re too tired to address important issues … They’d like to sit in their living rooms, watch big screen TV, and have the world leave them alone … [and they fall for Olmert’s promise that] We’ll get rid of Yesha and build a big wall” (Katz, 15). However, Katz, unlike myself goes on to denigrate this lapse in public behaviour “hoping that the country will wake up and see the dangers around us BEFORE it’s too late.” (Katz, 15) Olmert in Katz’s narrative is the seducer who unfortunately legitimizes the peoples’ desire to live in this fantasy world, and is, hence, doubtless leading them and the country to its ruin. Leaving Olmert, himself, and his behaviour out of the picture, in my narrative, where a self-interest era is not necessarily evil, a politician who leads this type of populous may be forced to cater to it, and will have to do his best (no matter where he is on the political spectrum) to protect it from its own over-self-interestedness. Olmert might argue that by adopting his platform, and not Yossi Beilin’s far more aggressive Geneva Plan, he is doing this.

fn.21 A point I do not have the space to argue for here, but which is certainly accepted as biblical writ by the right wing.

fn.22 ited in Schlessinger 42.

fn.23 Ibid 40.

fn.24 Ibid 43.

fn.25 February 16, 2006.

fn.26 In this the headline seemed partially misleading, for whatever the role of the officer receiving the message at Amona, the “sms” message dealt with the evacuation of a settlement in Gaza (Ganei Tal), not the Amona evacuation.

fn.27 A realization which Rav Yaakov Ariel, former head of a yeshiva in Gush Katif, healthily expressed when upon Ariel Sharon’s hospitalization he was quoted as saying: “Notwithstanding what he [Sharon] has done in the past year, Sharon is a Jew who has done a lot of good for his people.” However, somewhat problematically he added: “There is no danger that Sharon will come back and serve as prime minister, so why not pray for him?” Whether Rav Ariel was implying that if Sharon was likely to return, it would be inappropriate to pray for him is unclear; however, the doubt this quote raises serves to underline the right’s problematic relationship with the state. Indeed, some national-religious rabbi’s were even less enthusiastic about praying for Sharon. (For above quotes and the positions of various national-religious rabbis, see Wagner 3.)

fn.28 LookJed, III:23

fn.29 Derfner 12.

fn.30 Schlessinger, 40-41.

fn.31 In a Jerusalem Post (April, 10, 1998) article Yossi Mengistu, who works with Ethiopian olim to Israel critiques this approach: “Even if Israeli society did not do it on purpose, it created a severe problem… The fact that you come to a different society and are told to `throw away the culture you knew and learn a different one,’ – that way you can end up with nothing.” (Ibid 9) The attempt by society to educate an individual as to who he should be is, ultimately, disasterous, especially, if as in this case, it attempts to replace a pre-existing cultural orientation.

fn.32 Psychological validation for this approach is presented by Rabbi Reuven Bulka, who as a trained mental health care professional, writes: “ Viktor Frankl’s logotherapy is perhaps the most outstanding example of a therapeutic system which has grasped the importance of going beyond self-expression into the domain of self-transcendence, towards immersing one’s self in either another cause or another person. The insular focus on the self, which is a characteristic of the lonely, is also characteristic of a deficient relationship or a deficient personality. The mature, well-oriented individual finds meaning and fulfillment via fulfilling others.” However, as if sensing our objection to the dangers of this approach Bulka adds: “This is not to argue that individuals should be totally unconcerned about their own selves … Hillel’s balance is what is called for; intelligent concern for the self and devoted concern for the other.” (Bulka 60) Avoiding a total focus on the dictates of the Halakha, which would subsume the individual’s needs, Bulka also adds: “the Jew does not exist for the sake of Halakhah, rather Halakhah exists for the sake of the Jew” (Ibid 86-87). Thus, for Bulka the needs of the individual and the community are to be balanced, with neither subsuming the other.

fn.33 J. Sacks, 1995, 66.

fn.34 Lichtenstein, 1970, 424-425.

fn.35 J. Sacks, 1995, 57

fn.36 Hartman, 1997, 68-70.

fn.37 Ibid.

fn.38 Soloveitchik, 1978, 8.

fn. 39 Yonasan Sacks, 1990, 74-75.

fn.40 Hartman, 1997, 69.

fn.41 As Rabbi Reuven Bulka points out: “The law is the carefully constructed framework to elicit the highest level of one’s social and spiritual essence … In the words of Rav, `The precepts were given only in order that people might be refined by them. For what does the Holy One, blessed be God, care whether one kills an animal by the throat or by the nape of its neck?’ (Midrash Rabbah, Genesis, 44:1)” (Bulka 86-87) Thus, the halahkic system, properly guided, provides an excellent basis for structuring society. Without proper rabbinic guidance, as is obvious from my discussion above, self-transcendence, and the Halakha may ride roughshod over the individual. Bulka, like Sacks and Lichtenstein, seems to argue for this proper guidance and a society which exists in symbiosis with the individual.

fn.42 J. Sacks, 1995, 55-61.

Bibiliography

Bulka, Reuven P. “Loneliness,” Individual, Family, Community: Judeo-Psychological Perspectives. Oakville/New York/ London: Mosaic Press, 1989, 41-61.

Bulka, Reuven P. “The Role of the Individual in Jewish Law: Individual, Family, Community: Judeo-Psychological Perspectives”. Oakville/New York/ London: Mosaic Press, 1989, 75-88.

Derfner, Larry. “Proud to Walk Humbly,” The Jerusalem Post Magazine. November, 5, 1999, 10-13.

Hartman, David. “On Passover and Family Education,” Leader’s Guide for A Different Night. Eds. Noam Zion and David Dishon. U.S.A.: The Shalom Hartman Institute, 1997, 68 –70.

Katz, S. “Election Voices.” Editorial. Voices. February 2006, 3, 15.

Lichtenstein, Aaron. “Religion and State: The Case for Interaction” in “Arguments and Doctrines: A Reader of Jewish Thinking in the Aftermath of the Holocaust.” Selected with introductory essays by Arthur A. Cohen. New York/Evanston/London: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1970, 421-450.

Sacks, Jonathan. Faith in the Future. London: Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd., 1995.

Sacks, Yonason. “Individualism and Collectivism: A Torah Perspective,” in The Torah U-Madda Journal. Vol. 2. Ed. J. Schachter. Yeshiva University Press, 1990, 70-75

Schlessinger, Arthur M., Jr.,”The Cycles of American Politics,” The Cycles of American History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986, 23-48.

Soloveitchik, J.B. “The Community,” Tradition, 17:2.

Wagner, M. “Most, But Not All, Heed Call to Prayer,” The Jerusalem Post, January 6, 2006, 3.

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